IPv6 Transition Security: How IPv6 migration can rip your IPv4/NAT security
| Title: | IPv6 Transition Security: How IPv6 migration can rip your IPv4/NAT security (ID: CSD4130) | | Author(s): | Louis Labelle | | Topics: | IPv6, Network Security and Applications | | Origin: | Community Contributions (2003) | | Type: | Articles, Papers, and Reports | | Abstract: | Imagine starting SimCity with 2128 dollars! (That's 3.4 × 1038). The number and the possibilities are staggering; the challenge becomes an efficiency issue because of the sheer size.
IPv6 is a bit like that and then you add change management hurdles and the nonchalance of North American ISP's that simply do not have the pressure of their Asian and European counterparts. IPv6 thus represents many challenges, one of which must be security betterment. Some previous practical have already showed IPv6 has security issues and even recent IETF working groups meeting decided to deprecate previously accepted standards for security issues1.And the transition from IPv4, with the famed network address translator, will have to go safely for this new protocol to gain its grounds. Since there are plenty of
addresses for all the IP-enabled computers in the world, one should expect an onslaught Migration (with a big "M"), when some critical-mass popularity is obtained, either by an unforeseen killer app or market pressure.
Transition techniques are still being tested and developed today. In an effort to bring popular acceptance from consumer markets, some of those protocols even apply to home or small office networks with NAT border devices. This paper compares the risks involved between an established Internet technique, 'Configured Tunnels', and the high appeal technique of the Teredo proposal. We shall also examine what general measures can be taken to adequately address any security risks. | | View this resource: | |
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